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STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY P. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
License Division, Department of Pub-
lic Safety, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's license 
revocation by the appellant under Utah Implied Consent 
Law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On June 14,1974, appellant revoked the respondent's 
driver's license for the latter's alleged failure to submit 
to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 
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(1953), as amended, said revocation to be for one year. 
Pursuant to the provisions of said act, respondent, 
through her attorney, Richard J. Maughan, filed a com-
plaint and petition June 21, 1974, requesting a de novo 
hearing and further requesting a restoration of license 
pending appeal. Thereafter, new counsel, D. Gilbert 
Athay for the respondent, and counsel for the appellant, 
presented the matter at trial on the 5th day of Decem-
ber, 1974, before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall. Judge 
Hall found that the respondent did not unreasonably 
refuse to submit to a sobriety test. Consequently, Judge 
Hall ruled that the petition of the respondent to set 
aside the revocation .under administrative hearing be 
granted and that the respondent be ordered reinstated 
to her driving privileges. 
The order of the Third District Court Judge Gordon 
R. Hall was entered January 14, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order 
of January 14, 1975, ordering the restoration of the re-
spondent's driver's license and seeks an order in accord 
with appellant's prior administrative revocation. 
Respondent would have this court affirm the lower 
court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 16th day of April, 1974, Trooper Clint Hendry 
of the Utah State Highway Patrol observed respondent 
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while driving a vehicle southbound on a two-lane high-
way in the vicinity of 3500 South Redwood Road at 
approximately 2:30 o'clock a.m. Due to his observation 
the trooper stopped the vehicle and later determined 
it to be driven by the respondent. After investigation 
and observation of the respondent, the trooper decided 
that the respondent was under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor and placed her under arrest at approximately 
2:40 a'clock a.m. The respondent was advised of her 
constitutional rights as well as her rights under the 
Utah's Implied Consent Law, the same having been given 
to her by Trooper Hendry, and respondent indicated she 
understood said rights (R. 22-25). 
The respondent indicated at the scene that she would 
like to talk to her attorney (R. 25, line 26). At the jail, 
the respondent called Mr. Richard Maughan, her attor-
ney, which call occurred approximately 3:25 or 3:30 
o'clock a.m. Trooper Hendry also spoke to Mr. Maughan 
and upon being asked what advice he was giving Mrs. 
Peterson with respect to the chemical test, Trooper 
Hendry was advised by attorney Maughan that he 
though he had better jump into some clothes and run on 
down and have a little chat with the respondent. Trooper 
Hendry agreed to that. Trooper Hendry advised Mrs. 
Peterson, the respondent, of her rights on more than two 
occasions, two of which were at the jail (R. 27). The 
respondent was offered either a blood test or a breath 
test, to which the respondent said "I don't want to take 
any tests until my attorney was present (R. 27, line 
27-28). See also (R. 43). Trooper Hendry was prepared 
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to administer a breath test and was a qualified operator 
of the breathalyzer. If required, persons were available 
for a blood test (R. 28). Attorney Don Sawaya of the 
county attorney's office was also present (R. 28). The 
respondent and Trooper Hendry waited approximately 
45 minutes, after which time contact was made by phone 
to Mr. Maughan's residence and respondent was advised 
and she advised the officer that Mr. Maughan should be 
at the jail within five minutes or so. Trooper Hendry 
waited by his record approximately 15 minutes longer 
mid then left the jail when Mr. Maughan had not ap-
peared (R. 29). 
Trooper Hendry advised the respondent "that I 
could not wait any longer time since the driving 
that occurred had been two hours. I had been at the 
jail since 3:10 a.m., it was now 4:30; and I asked her 
(Mrs. Peterson) one more time if she would take a 
chemical test for us, either a Wood test or a breath test, 
and explained the consequences of refusing to take the 
test" (R. 29, lines 14-19). The respondent indicated 
she did not want to take any test without her attorney 
present (R. 29, lines 23 and 23, R. 31, R. 38, lines 5 and 
6). Respondent disputes that 15 additional minutes were 
waited, alleging maybe 10 minutes is all that elapsed. 
Trooper Hendry left the jail and went to the parking 
lot of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, where he waited 
approximately 15 minutes while compiling his reports 
(R. 31, 32). Trooper Hendry informed no one at the 
jail that he would be waiting in the parking lot, that 
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not being his customary procedure. Within approximately 
five minutes after Trooper Hendry left the jail, Mr. 
Richard Maughan, the attorney for respondent, arrived 
at the jail to converse with respondent (R. 45). 
Upon cross-examination, Trooper Hendry stated that 
the respondent had an opportunity to talk to her lawyer 
(R. 34, lines 8-9). Trooper Hendry was not advised at 
any time that Mr. Maughan had arrived at the jail (R. 
38, lines 22-24). Trooper Hendry did advise respondent 
that if she did not take the test he would file a refusal 
and she indicated she did not want to take any tests 
without her attorney present (R. 29). Trooper Hendry 
found the attorney not coming by 4:30 a.m. noteworthy 
as follows: 
"I thought it was a bit unusual — what 
struck me unusual about it was that he hadn't 
cared to advise his client on the phone, which 
is a common practice, and that he had insisted 
on coming down and then that an hour had 
transpired and he hadn't appeared. That struck 
me as unusual, yes" (R. 39, lines 11-16). 
The respondent agrees that the time between the 
first and the second call was probably 45 minutes (R. 
44, lines 27-28). The respondent agreed that there was 
no requesit from either herself or attorney Maughan to 
any of the jailer personnel to have Trooper Hendry re-
turn to the jail (R. 46, 47). Respondent and her attorney 
left immediately on her own rewgnizanee not more than 
fifteen or twenty minutes later (R. 46, line 22). 
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The trial court held that respondent had a right 
to contact counsel prior to deciding whether to take the 
offered chemical test under the Implied Consent Law. 
Further, that respondent's conduct under the above set 
of facts did not constitute a refusal to submit to a chem-
ical test of her blood or breath such as would warrant 
the suspension of her driver's license. 
Thereafter, the court held that the petition of re-
spondent should be granted and that the revocation of 
June 7, 1974, should be rescinded and respondent's driv-
ing privileges reinstated. 
BACKGROUND 
In hope of curbing the tremendousc increase in acci-
dents and deaths and to help overcome many of the 
difficulties in proving the fact of drinking and driving, 
the legislatures of many states, including Utah, have 
enacted Implied Consent Laws requiring persons licensed 
to drive to submit to a chemical analysis of their breath, 
blood or urine to determine if they are driving under the 
influence of alcohol or some drug. These laws uniformly 
hold that the refusal to submit to such a test while yet 
a licensed driver are grounds for the revocation of the 
driving privilege. 
In summary, courts view the Implied Consent Law 
as a means (1) of assisting the court in ascertaining the 
truth of the charge that the defendant was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, by encouraging 
the defendant to take a chemical test to determine the 
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condition of his blood. Scientific evidence thus obtained 
provides an objective evaluation. This evaluation achieves 
additional benefits (a) to help xhe public and protect 
them by removing drunk drivers from the highway, (b) 
helps innocent parsons who may have the odor of alcohol 
on their breath but have not been drinking to excess but 
whose conduct may create the appearance of intoxication 
when the driver may be suffering from some other physi-
cal condition that gives such impression, and further 
(c) helps provide information on the causes of accidents 
which is important in the development of a successful 
accident prevention program. 
In each Implied Consent case, basic requisites must 
apply. These include (a) probable cause to consider the 
driver to be intoxicated, (b) an arrest, (c) a designation 
by the peace officer within reason of the test to be ad-
ministered, (d) the refusal either express or implied is 
communicated to or within reason presumed by the peace 
officer. The relevant wording of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44.10 (1953), as amended, is as follows: 
"(a) Any person operating a motor ve-
hicle in this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test of his breath or 
blood for the purpose of determining the alco-
holic content of his blood, provided that such 
test is administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe 
such person to have been driving in an intoxi-
cated condition. The arresting officer shall de-
termine within reason which of the aforesaid 
tests shall be administered . . . (c) If such 
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person has been placed under arrest and has 
thereafter been requested to submit to any one 
of the chemical tests, provided for in subsec-
tions (a) or (b) of this section and refuses to 
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not 
be given and the arresting officer shall advise 
the person of his rights under this section." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT TO 
A REQUIRED CHEMICAL TEST UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, UNTIL A PERSONAL CON-
FERENCE WITH HER ATTORNEY AT 
T H E J A I L , IS NOT A "REASONABLE 
CAUSE" NOT TO SUBMIT, IF THE TIME 
OF PERSONAL CONFERENCE IS SO FAR 
REMOVED AS TO RENDER POTENTIAL-
LY OBTAINABLE TEST RESULTS MEAN-
INGLESS. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not 
specifically ruled on the question of how much time may 
elapse before it is too late to obtain chemical test results 
or how long a peace officer must wait, that is to say 
what is a reasonable length of time to wait, under the 
circumstances generally, before there is "unecessary de-
lay," or before any results obtainable may be meaning-
less. 
In the case at bar, a real issue is whether Trooper 
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Hendry was reasonable or unreasonable in failing to 
wait beyond an hour from the time that attorney Richard 
Maughan said he would come to the jail. The respon-
dent could argue, of course, that she was following her 
attorney's advice in waiting until he arrived before 
submitting to a test. This procedure, without parameters 
as to time, carried to its logical conclusion could make 
the villain of an attorney, not the one arrested, and the 
one with the duty of decision, the respondent, and 
the results that would flow from such a decision 
would be totally opposite from the purpose intended by 
the legislature in creating the Implied Consent Law. 
(A) Time Factor. 
Funke v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal. 
App. 3d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1969), holds that 
it is common knowledge that time lapse between inges-
tion of alcohol and blood tests effects accuracy of test 
results. 
A recent Oregon case, decided December 9, 1974, 
Cavagnaro v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of 
Transportation, Or. App., 521 P. 2d 1090 (1974), held 
that evidence showing that motorist refused to take 
breathalyzer test, until he talked to an attorney, and 
that the peace officer allowed 15 minutes to contact the 
attorney and waited twice that long during which period 
motorist was unable to reach attorney and then advised 
motorist of his rights, that the officer then turned off 
his machine, and the motorist 15 minutes later reached 
his attorney and said he would take the test; that the 
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officer's declining to administer the test over two hours 
after the motorist's arrest, all failed to support the judg-
ment of the lower trial court vacating suspension of the 
motorist's driver's license by the Department of Trans-
poration for refusal to take a breathalyzer test, and the 
court reversed the trial court, holding it a refusal. In 
that case the court quotes a previous Oregon decision, 
Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 4 Or. App. 
313, 477 P. 2d 237 (1970), 478 P. 2d 654, Supreme Court 
review denied 1971, where the court in quoting a New 
Jersey case of 1970, State v. Pandoli, 109 N. J. Super. 
1, 262 A. 2d 41 (1970), where the driver contended that 
there was no flat refusal to take the test where he re-
fused to take the test until he had an opportunity to call 
his attorney; the Oregon Court approves the language 
of the New Jersey Court quoted as follows: 
" 'In any event, the request for consulta-
tion with counsel necessarily involved a delay 
in the administration of the test. Having in 
mind the remedial purpose of the statute, and 
the rapidity with which the passage of time and 
the psychological processes tend to eliminate 
evidence of ingested alcohol in the system,, it 
is sensible to construe the statute to mean that 
anything substantially short of an unqualified, 
unequivocal assent to an officer's request that 
the arrested motorist take the test constitutes 
a refusal to do so. '" 
The court then cites another Oregon case elsewhere re* 
ferred to in the brief Johnson v. Department of Motor 
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Vehicles, 5 Or. App. 617, 485 P. 2d 1258 (1971), as sup-
portive/ 
The Oregon Court concludes in the Cavagnaro case 
as follows: 
"We conclude that as a matter of law, the 
voluntary postponement for a specified period of 
time of the administration of a breathalyzer 
test by a police officer to enable the driver to 
contact an attorney does not itself constitute 
the waiver of a valid previous demand to take 
the test beyond the time allowed by the officer." 
Id. at 1092. 
This should be the rule of law in the case at bar. The 
fact that two hours had elapsed from time of arrest 
would control. The officer had not abandoned his previ-
ous requests, when he advised the respondent at 4:30 
a.m. that he wanted her to express if she would take 
the test before he left. 
An analysis of the Hunter case does indicate that 
the delay was over an hour within which time Dr. Hunter, 
after refusing consistently, then said that he would take 
a blood test and the officer refused, saying it was too 
late. By distinction, in this case, the reasonable time 
lapsed, in the officer's opinion, before the attorney c^me. 
Certainly, the courts should not be placed in the 
position to ratify without some parameters of reasonable-
ness some time frame that would control; otherwise, 
attorneys could with impunity, advise clients in similar 
circumstances not to take the test or to wait until the 
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ajttorney came to the jail, whether in fact this did or did 
not occur, which would require peace officers to wait 
before booking procedures for extended periods of time, 
unduly burdening their work schedules, not knowing for 
sure whether the attorney will or will not come, and all 
the while any measureable quantitative test and its use 
or validity thereby diminishing to the point of non-value. 
Appellant submits that based upon the facts at trial, 
the evidence clearly shows that the failure to submit to 
the requested chemical test on the part of the respon-
dent, an hour from the time of consultation on the phone 
with her attorney and at that point of time two hours 
beyond the time of arrest, was unreasonable. 
If there was any confusion in respondent's mind as 
to whether she should proceed to take the test or stand 
the consequences of losing her license for a year, that 
confusion was created by counsel and not by the peace 
officer. Subsequent advice of Trooper Hendry was clear 
that so much time had elapsed that she would then have 
to make a decision on her own as to whether she would 
take the test or not, and if she failed to take the test 
at that point in time, he would have to count it as a re-
fusal, as he was required to leave. (Emphasis ours.) 
Trooper Hendry had been patient, cooperative and 
without arbitrariness. 
The failure on the part of the respondent or her 
counsel to request Officer Hendry's return, if the attor-
ney's arrival was so close as to cause the suggestion that 
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Trooper Hendry was impatient, then again it was the 
responsibility of respondent and/or her counsel or both 
to ask for a test and make some reasonable request to get 
the same if they did not want to suffer the consequences 
of the submission of a refusal affidavit to the state, a 
hearing thereon, and the subsequent revocation as did 
occur in this case prior to trial de novo. 
(B) Public Interest. 
An Oregon decision sets forth the balance that 
must be given weight between public's interest and that 
of the driver. In a decision rendered August 25, 1972, 
the Court in Kauffman v. Motor Vehicle Division, De-
partment of Transportation, Or. App. 1*72, 500 P. 2d 
475, in a case where the driver blew into the breathalyzer 
which was not functioning propertly and thereafter re-
fused to blow a second time at the request of the officer, 
subsequent to his attorney then advising the driver not 
to blow a second time and as a result the driver refusing 
to do so, from which of course no reading was obtained 
from the breathalyzer, the Court said: 
"Petitioner was not prejudiced by the offi-
cer's error. Upon its prompt discovery, he was 
asked to breath into the machine a second time. 
There is no contention that the machine was 
not in proper operating order or that the un-
measured first blow could have effected the 
correct measurement of the one he refused. 
Therefore, since the policy of the statute to re-
move drunk drivers from the highway outweighs 
any possible prejudice which the second at-
tempted test would have caused the petitioner, 
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we conclude that the petitioner as a matter of 
law was not justified or excused in refusing to 
submit to the breathalyzer test a second time/' 
The court reversed the trial finding. 
The same public policy exists in Utah as enunciated 
by the Oregon court that the policy of the Implied Con-
sent Law to attempt to remove drunk drivers from the 
road has a higher priority and the law should be upheld, 
not rendered meaningless, as is the attempt here. 
Therefore as to the question should a license be revoked 
for a refusal under the fact situation presented, the an-
swer is dearly yes. It can only be condxided under the 
facts before the court that if there was probable cause, 
and if the driver was arrested, and if the person was 
properly advised of her rights, and if the driver was given 
an opportunity to consult with an attorney, and if the 
driver failed to submit within a reasonable time to a 
chemical test with or without the presence of her attor-
ney, it is dearly a refusal. 
The fact that the officer agreed at first to the ap-
pearance of counsel does not negate the fact that a re-
quest for a test was made prior to that point in time 
and both respondent and counsel knew it. This acqui-
esence does not, as a voluntary postponement, act as a 
waiver on the part of the officer of a valid previous de-
mand to take the test, and when approximately two 
hours had elapsed from the time of arrest, it should be 
concluded as a matter of law respondent's failure to 
submit is a refusal. (Emphasis ours.) 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED AT LAW THAT THE 
HUNTER V. DORIUS CASE, SUPRA, HOLD-
ING A "RIGHT TO CONSULT LEGAL 
COUNSEL" INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO 
HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT PRIOR TO 
SUBMISSION TO A TEST, 
The Utah Implied Consent Law could be rendered 
meaningless if the court were to let stand the proposition 
that an attorney could be present before a chemical test 
under the Implied Consent Law could be administered 
and the attorney, for whatever reason, failed to show up 
at the jail for an hour or two hours or for an extended 
period of time, whatever it may be, and that by virtue 
of said time lapse would negate the results of any chem-
ical test then to be administered. 
This question of right to consult an attorney, or 
the right to have an attorney present at a jail before 
one, in the position of the respondent, were to make a 
decision to either take or not take a requested chemical 
test is one of many constitutional issues that have been 
raised over the years in respect to the Implied Consent 
Law. In summary, as to constitutional issues in general, 
case law has established that the Implied Consent type 
law does not violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, nor is an unreasonable search and seizure involved, 
and it meets the requirements of due process of law. I t 
is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law nor does 
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the Implied Consent Law breach the equal protection 
laws. It does not violate the separation of powers doc-
trine or freedom of speech. 
In speaking to the question of right to counsel, see 
the case of Fallis v. Department of Motor Vehicle, July 
1968, 264 A. C. A. 441, 70 Cal. Rp.tr. 595, Ent v. Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App. 2d 936, 71 Cal. 
Rpitr. 726, sets forth the general rule of most jurisdic-
tions: 
"Neither the denial of the opportunity for 
advice of counsel before stating whether one will 
submit to a test and before deciding which test 
to take, nor the denial of the opportunity to 
have counsel present while the test is adminis-
tered, is the denial of any constitutional right." 
The Court quoted the above declaration in Ent v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, supra. In the Ent case, ihe 
court concluded by citing United States v. Wade, 388 
U. S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), as 
further authority that no right to counsel attached. 
In States that hold a minority position, of which 
Utah is apparently one, the New York Court of Appeals 
in People v. Gursey, 22 N. Y. 2d 224, 292 N. Y. S. 2d 416, 
239 N. E. 2d 351, 352-53 (1968), wisely stated: 
"The privilege of consulting with counsel 
concecraiing the exercise of legal rights should not, 
however, extend so far as to palpably impair or 
nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers 
to choose between taking the test or losing their 
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licenses. It is common knowledge that the hu-
man body dissipates alcohol rapidly and, indeed, 
tinder subdivision 3 of section 1192 of the Ve-
hicle and Traffic Law, test results are admissible 
in evidence only if the test had been taken with-
in two hours of the time of arrest. Where the 
defendant wishes only to telephone his lawyer 
or consult with a lawyer present in the station 
house or immediately available there, no danger 
of delay is posed. But to be sure, there can be 
no recognition of an absolute right to refuse the 
test until a lawyer reaches the scene (see Matter 
of Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N. Y. 2d 58, 61, 226 
N. Y. S. 2d 403, 181 N. E. 2d 427, 429) . . . If 
the lawyer is not physically present and cannot 
be readied promptly by telephone or otherwise, 
the defendant may be required to elect between 
taking the test and submitting to revocation of 
his license, without the aid of counsel." 
Certainly the fair import of the Gursey case is that 
a driver could consult with his attorney if he was present 
or could be reached promptly by phone before submitting 
to a test, but that there was no absolute right to refuse 
until an attorney was reached if the attorney was not 
immediately available. See Appendix A for additional 
cases in this area. (Emphasis ours.) 
New York, which like Utah holds that a driver in 
these drcumstances should have the privilege of con-
sulting with an attorney concerning the exercise of legal 
rights, nevertheless is clear to point out that this privi-
lege or right, should not "extend so far as to . . . impair 
or nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers to 
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choose between taking the test or losing their licenses 
. . ." and that there are times when ". . . the defendant 
may be required to elect. . . without the aid of counsel/' 
People v. Gursey, Id. This case on appeal is such a case. 
In contrast to the New York Vehicle law, Utah has 
no rule that test results are admissible only if the test 
has been taken within two hours of the time of arrest. 
There are other states in addition to New York who do 
have such a rule. 
Within this jurisdiction, we have the holding of the 
Hunter v. Dorius, case, supra, stating at page 124, 23 
Utah 2d 122, as follows: 
"After the plaintiff had been advised as to 
his rights under the statute and the conse-
quences of his refusal to submit to a test at the 
hour of 9:48 p.m., the plaintiff still had a rea-
sonable time in which to make up his mind and 
seek legal counsel." 
Just prior to that statement the Court further 
stated: 
"It is conceded by the defendant that the 
plaintiff had a right to consult legal counsel 
before making a decision to take or decline the 
test." (Emphasis ours.) 
The court does not amplify whether this right to 
legal counsel existed as a result of the concession thereof 
by the defendant or defendant's counsel. It was agree-
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able to the officer in the Hunter case that an attorney 
be called as is the situation before the court in the case 
at bar. The question is whether that right is an absolute 
right as some would argue the Hunter case stands for 
or whether there is a distinction between right of con-
sultation, and right to have the attorney present. (Em-
phasis ours.) 
In the Hunter v. Dorius, case, it specifically states 
that a driver had a right to consult legal counsel before 
making a decision to take or decline the test. The re-
spondent in the case at bar had such an opportunity 
and did in fact consult with the attorney on the phone. 
The Hunter case does not stand for the proposition that 
the respondent in a case such as before the court, has a 
right to the personal presence of her attorney at the jail 
prior to submitting to such a test. The attorney could 
have given respondent any necessary advice on the tele-
phone. Such advice was so given Dr. Hunter in the 
Hunter v. Dorius, case. 
Drivers on the highways of Utah are presumed to 
know the law. A peace officer such as Trooper Hendry 
has the duty to advise said parties so arrested of their 
rights. One lawfully arrested, properly advised of his 
rights, thereafter refusing or failing to take the chemical 
test as denoted by the officer within reason, must de-
termine whether to take or not take the test and stand 
the risk of losing his privilege to drive for one year if 
he so fails to take the test without reasonable cause. 
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Appellant avers that the trial court, in holding respon-
dent's conduct did not constitute a refusal is attempting 
to draw some distinction and hold that right to confer 
with an attorney means the right to wait until he was 
present before submitting to the test. (Emphasis ours.) 
In the case of Johnson v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles of the State of Oregon, 485 P. 2d 1285, the arrested 
driver was unable to reach his attorney but his daughter 
got ahold of an attorney who tliereaf ter advised the 
driver to take a breathalyzer when he got there (mean-
ing the jail). The attorney did not arrive at the jail 
prior to the officer leaving and filing a refusal affidavit. 
The trial court, as in the case at bar, held that the driv-
er's failure to take a test did not constitute a refusal 
under the drcumstances. The appellate court said that 
any erroneous impression upon which the driver relied 
in failing to take the breathalyzer, was created by his 
counsel, not by the police, and the appellate court re-
versed the trial court. Appellant suggests this case is 
closely on point. 
POINT III. 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE 
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
According to the record, the evidence and the find-
ings of fact are not in dispute except as to one small 
point: that is, as to whether or not Trooper Hendry 
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waited approximately 15 minutes after the second phone 
call at 4:15 o'clock a.m. prior to leaving the jail at ap-
proximately 4:30 a.m. or whether it was five to ten min-
utes as set forth in the Statement of Pacts (R. 11, 12, 
13), to which appellant takes issue. 
The last sole question, therefore, to be determined 
is: Did the trial court piroperly conclude as a matter 
of law that the respondent consented to take the sobriety 
test? 
Since the state of the record of the findings of fact 
are as above stated,, the comment of Mr. Justice EUetit 
in his dissenting opinion in Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 
2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969), applies and appellant 
quotes: 
"The sole question to be determined is: Did 
the trial court properly conclude as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff consented to take a sobri-
ety test? Since the evidence is not in dispute, 
the trial court is in no better position to rule 
upon the matter than is this court." 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that the 
time from arrest at 2:40 o'clock a.m. to the time approxi-
mately Mr. Maughan arrived at the jail was two hours, 
the attorney's arrival being beyond dispute at 4:35 or 
4:40 o'clock a.m. It is further uncontested that after 
the arrival of counsel, no request was made of any jail 
personnel nor was any attempt made to have Trooper 
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Hendry return to the jail with Mr. Maughan's arrival 
being so shortly after the officer's departure. 
The evidence is further unrebutted that the respon-
dent was aware of the officer's concern, that it would 
be beyond two hours before any test could be adminis-
tered from the time of the arrest and well beyond two 
hours from the time of first stopping the respondent 
and considerably longer than that from the time that 
any alcoholic beverages were consumed by respondent, 
which fact was clearly admitted by respondent (R. 47). 
Such drinks bad occurred at home before going to eat 
(R. 47). Respondent asked to consult with a lawyer. 
That was permitted. Se did talk to the attorney from 
the jail (emphasis ours) and he advised both Trooper 
Hendry and respondent that he was coming to the jail. 
The officer waited an additional hour, informed respon-
dent that he could not wait any longer, told her the 
consequences of her failure to make a decision to take 
a test prior to his leaving, gave her her rights again, and 
yet respondent consistently said that she would do noth-
ing until her attorney arrived. When her attorney ar-
rived, neither respondent nor attorney indicated to any 
of the jail personnel that she would take a test or wanted 
to take a test of any kind nor did they communicate with 
the arresiting officer who appellant alleges reasonable 
men could assume would still be in his vehicle either 
checking out or on his way home within the time period 
alleged had elapsed of not more than 15 minutes befloate 
respondent left the jail herself. 
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The evidence in the case before us shows that the 
delay ocasioned, waiting for counsel to come to the jail, 
was unreasonable and was not justified, especially where 
respondent had an opportunity to talk to and consult 
with the attorney on the phone. 
Respondent was properly advised as to the conse-
quences of her refusal to take a test. If respondent, 
after notice by the officer that he had to leave and could 
not wait longer, in the performance of his duties, chose 
to wait further until counsel would arrive, it being in 
the opinion of the officer that sufficient time had elapsed, 
to permit said arrival, then the consequences of failing 
to take the test prior to Trooper Hendry's leaving the 
jail is a consequence, adverse though the results may 
be, that must be borne by the respondent as a result 
of her failure to promptly decide after she was given a 
second opportunity to take a sobriety test, which was 
the case her. 
The court's finding that there was a consent by 
Mrs. Peterson, the respondent, to take the chemical test 
requested by the trooper, and that said consent was not 
rebutted, is not supported by the evidence or the law 
and therefore this case should be reversed and remanded 
on that ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that for the reasons 
above stated in this appeal, the order of the trial court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
should be reversed and the case remanded with instruc-
tions for the trial court to revoke respondent's driving 
privileges for one year. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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